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Abstract: We use a unique dataset that combines the responses from an original survey of
households, information about the structural characteristics of their homes, utility-provided
longitudinal electricity usage records, plus utility program participation information, to study the
uptake of energy efficiency incentives and their effect on residential electricity consumption.
Attention is restricted to homes where heating and cooling are provided exclusively by heat
pumps, which are common in our study area—four counties in Maryland—and were covered by
federal, state and utility incentives during our study period (2007-2012). We deploy a differencein-difference study design. We find that replacing an existing heat pump with a new one does
reduce electricity usage: the average treatment effect is an 8% reduction. However, the effect
differs dramatically across households based upon whether they receive an incentive towards the
purchase of a new heat pump. Among those that receive the purchase incentive, the effect is
small or nil, and indeed, the larger the incentive, the smaller the reduction in electricity usage.
Those that do not receive incentives reduce usage by about 16%. Our results appear to be driven
by the numerous free riders in our sample and by persons who—inferred from their responses to
survey questions—might be exploiting the subsidy to purchase a larger system and increase
usage, with no emissions reductions benefits to society.
JEL Classification: Q41, D12, H3
Keywords: Energy Efficiency, Household Behavior, Energy Efficiency Incentives, Electricity
Usage, Rebound Effect, Free Rider.
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Residential energy efficiency policies in the US and several other countries have
traditionally relied on standards for equipment and new home construction, on incentives, and,
more recently, on the explicit provision of information about the energy efficiency of devices
and buildings.2 These approaches have received much recent attention due to i) the large
contribution of buildings to total energy use (30-40%) and the associated carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions, ii) assessments that improving energy efficiency in buildings would reduce carbon
emissions at low or even negative cost (Levine et al. 2007; Choi Granade et al., 2009), and iii)
the view that homeowners are reluctant to invest in energy efficiency improvements.3
Incentives usually take the form of tax credits or direct rebates to the consumers who
install insulation or energy-saving windows, and/or purchase high-efficiency heating systems, air
conditioners, water heaters, and appliances. Between 2005 and 2009, federal expenditure on
residential energy efficiency programs was $2.2 billion (2009 $) (Allaire and Brown, 2011), and
in fiscal year 2013 federal expenditures on tax preferences targeting energy efficiency
improvements in existing and new homes reached almost $4 billion (2013 $) (Dinan, 2013).
Proper assessment of the effectiveness of incentive programs is inherently problematic
because of adverse selection (people are replacing equipment at the end of life; Sandler, 2012)
and the likelihood that the programs attract people who are systematically (and unobservably)
more motivated or productive at reducing usage. These considerations have led observers to
conclude that, unless the presence of “free riders”—persons who pocket the incentive, but would
have done the energy-efficiency renovation or upgrade anyway—is adequately accounted for,
assessments will generally overstate the cost-effectiveness of the programs, i.e., the cost per unit

2

See www.muredatabase.org (last accessed 7 August 2013).
Debate continues as to whether an “energy efficiency gap” truly exists and what its causes are (Jaffe and Stavins,
1994; Hassett and Metcalf, 1993; Golove and Eto, 1996; Allcott and Greenstone, 2012). See Gillingham and Palmer
(2013) for a recent discussion.
3
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of energy or carbon emissions saved (Joskow and Marron, 1992; Hartman, 1988; Waldman and
Ozog, 1996).4
Other undesirable behavioral responses are possible. For example, using data from
Canada, Young (2008) documents that many households do not dispose of old and inefficient
refrigerators, once they replace them with new ones, and keep using them as “beer fridges” (to
store cold beverages), for a net increase in electricity consumption. This can be avoided with
careful incentive program design, which in turn will increase program complexity and the
associated administrative and enforcement costs. Similarly, in programs that seek to replace
conventionally-generated electricity with electricity generated from renewables, Jacobsen et al.
(2009) find that participating households actually increased electricity usage, despite the fact that
the price per kWh is higher than that of conventionally generated power.
Past evaluations often relied on engineering estimates of the energy savings from certain
technologies or measures, without observing actual behaviors, and as such, depending on study
design and implementation specifics, may have either over- or understated the true energy
savings (Jacobsen and Kotchen, 2013; Greening et al., 2000; Sorrell et al., 2009; Metcalf and
Hassett, 1999). The form of the incentive may matter, above and beyond the incentive amount
(Gallagher and Muehlegger, 2011), and the heterogeneity across programs makes it difficult to
extrapolate results across studies and contexts.5

4

Free riding is generally held to be pervasive in energy efficiency incentive programs. Earlier studies (Joskow and
Marron, 1992; Malm, 1996) have produced a wide range of estimates of the share of free riders. Grosche and Vance
(2009) examine renovations using a cross-section of data from the 2005 German Residential Energy Consumption
Survey, and conclude that free-riding occurs in 50% of the cases. Boomhower and Davis (2013) predict that 75% of
the households in a large-scale appliance replacement program in Mexico would have still replaced their appliances
if the rebate was zero. Energy models often make assumptions about the share of free riders. For example, Allaire
and Brown (2011) assume that 50% of the incentive takers are free riders.
5
In a different setting (hybrid passenger vehicles), Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011) find that tax credits are more
effective than non-tax incentives (such as allowing single-occupancy hybrid cars to be driven in high-occupancy
vehicle lanes) in increasing the sales of hybrids. Consumers are three times more responsive to state sale tax credits
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It is not, therefore, surprising that the empirical evidence to date about energy efficiency
incentives has been mixed. For example, Dubin and Henson (1988) and Walsh (1989) find that
they have no effect on energy efficiency renovations (or expenditures), but in Hassett and
Metcalf (1995) a 10% increase in the tax credit leads to a 24% increase in the likelihood of
performing energy-efficiency home improvements. Boomhower and Davis (2013) deploy a
regression discontinuity design to study a large-scale appliance replacement program in Mexico
and conclude that the rebate does increase program participation, but not by much. A 54%
increase in the rebate offered by the program (from $110 to $170) raises participation by only
21%. The cost-effectiveness of the program in terms of CO2 emissions is thus poor. Grosche,
Schmidt and Vance (2012) predict that as incentives increase, households substitute away from
simpler, less expensive energy-efficiency renovations (such as adding insulation or replacing the
heating system) to more complex and expensive ones (e.g., windows, doors, or other structural
changes). The latter are less cost-effective in terms of energy savings and carbon emissions
reductions.
Empirical work on incentive programs and their effects is, however, no easy task. In the
handful of US government-conducted surveys about residential energy use and energy-efficiency
investments, renovations are not described in sufficient detail and information about energyefficiency incentives is scanty or absent altogether. Some authors use electricity or gas
consumption records provided by the utilities to examine responsiveness to shocks (such as price
changes or the provision of feedback on consumption, e.g. Allcott, 2011), but these studies
usually lack information about the dwelling and energy efficiency upgrades, which are ignored
or assumed away.

than income tax credits, perhaps as a result of the stronger salience of and ease of calculating an immediate sale tax
credit
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To circumvent these limitations in the literature, we designed and implemented our own
survey of households and have carefully attempted to address each data weakness (or omission)
mentioned above in the construction of the sample. We conducted our survey in four counties in
Maryland. In the five years prior to the survey, Maryland residents had plentiful opportunities to
avail themselves of energy-efficiency incentives. In addition to the incentives made available by
President Bush’s Energy Policy Act (2005) and President Obama’s stimulus package of 2009,
Maryland residents received state and utility-offered incentives in 2010 and 2011.
The survey questionnaire asked owners of single-family homes whether in the last five
years they had 1) replaced the heating system, 2) replaced the air conditioning system, and 3)
installed wall or attic insulation, new windows, etc. If so, we further asked them whether they
received a rebate or tax credit on the purchase, how much that rebate or tax credit was for, and
whether they would have still done the replacement(s) or installation(s), had the rebate or tax
credit been absent altogether.
We sent letters to 10,000 Maryland households who own the homes they live in. A total
of 1153 of them filled out our questionnaire in September-December 2011. We conducted
follow-ups of subsamples of participants and non-participants in the summer of 2012.
A unique aspect of our study is that for all of the 10,000 households that were invited to
participate in the survey, we have extensive information about the dwelling and its structural
characteristics. Additional information about the characteristics of housing and residents in the
census tract and census block group where each household lives comes from the Census. We also
have these households’ monthly electricity usage and billing records (provided by the local
utility) from December 2007 to April 2012, and information about participation in utility
programs.
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These sources of data allow us to create a unique panel dataset that we use to study
equipment replacement, uptake of incentives, and their effect on energy use. We ask three key
research questions. First, in a setting where energy efficiency standards are present, does
replacing the heating/cooling system with a new and (at least on paper) more energy-efficient
system truly reduce energy use? Second, is there heterogeneity in the effect of changing the
heating and cooling equipment? If so, what are the main drivers of this heterogeneity? Third, do
households who apply for and receive incentives reduce their electricity consumption more,
either because they are more “productive” at reducing usage (Joskow and Marron, 1992) or
because they are required to purchase more energy-efficient equipment?
In this paper attention is focused on homes served solely by heat pumps. A heat pump is a
type of heating technology popular in temperate regions due to its ability to function as both a
heater in the winter and an air conditioner in the summer. Heat pumps are common in our study
area, which is not served by a natural gas line network. We study heat pump replacements. The
2005 Energy Policy Act required that as of 2006 all new heat pumps meet certain energy
efficiency standards, which means that households that replaced their heat pumps in the five
years prior to the survey must have adopted more energy-efficient equipment.
We use a difference-in-difference approach where the treatment group is comprised of
those who changed their heat pumps within the last five years, the control group is comprised of
those who haven’t, and the treatment is defined as the replacement of a heat pump. We further
examine if the treatment effect on electricity usage depends on household and house
characteristics, if it is different for households who received an incentive for their purchase, and
if it depends on the incentive amount. We investigate heterogeneity and incentive effects with
fixed-effects “within” estimation and fixed-effects quantile regressions.
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Briefly, we find that replacing an existing heat pump with a new one reduces electricity
usage, after we control for household-specific fixed effects, weather and time of the year. The
average treatment effect is an 8% reduction. This figure, however, masks a striking difference in
usage reductions across “natural replacers” (those that replace units without incentives) and
incentive recipients—and the difference is the opposite of what we expected. The former reduce
their electricity usage by about 16%; for the latter the reduction is virtually nil. This happens
despite the fact that the manufacturer-specific energy efficiency ratings and the expenditure on
the new heat pump is virtually identical across the two groups of replacers.
We also find that the larger the rebate, the less the electricity reduction. For all practical
purposes, rebates of $1000 or more have no effect on usage. Rebates of $300 and $450 (the
typical rebates offered by utility or state programs) result in usage reduction of 6.22% and 5.5%
respectively.
Our findings emphasize the importance of relying on actual energy using measurements,
which will incorporate behavioral responses, rather than engineering estimates (Jacobsen and
Kotchen, 2013), and that manufacturer-specified energy efficiency ratings and expenditure on
equipment is only one part of the story about energy-using equipment choice and its utilization.
Much of the debate in the energy-efficiency incentive literature has focused on the
argument that incentives are being spent on energy usage reductions that would have happened
anyway. Our findings raise the possibility that, in a setting where energy efficient standards are
present, rebates or tax credits may actually be counterproductive, in that they result in no
reductions in usage (and hence emissions) at all. The survey responses provide suggestive
evidence that the “rebaters” were disproportionately replacing “inadequate” units, leading us to
conjecture that the rebates are being used to defray the cost of more powerful units, or of units
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that end up being used more. This is consistent with evidence from the quantile regressions that
households with low usage, conditional on weather and dwelling and household characteristics,
had smaller usage reductions or even increased their usage. We also find that free riding is
pervasive in our sample, and our free riders likewise tend to reduce electricity use less than the
other households.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We provide background in section 2.
Section 3 describes the study design. Section 4 presents theoretical considerations and the
econometric approach. Section 5 describes the data. Section 5 presents the estimation results, and
section 6 concludes.

2. Background: Energy Efficiency Incentives and Standards for Heat Pumps
In the five years before the main survey of this paper, Maryland residents had ample
opportunities to avail themselves of subsidies for replacing their heat pumps with more energyefficient ones. Funding came from the federal government (in the form of tax credits) and
Maryland utilities participating in the State’s EmPower Program (in the form of rebates).
The 2005 Energy Policy Act established tax credits for 10% of the cost, with a cap of
$500. These tax credits were to expire at the end of 2008. The Energy Policy Act also established
energy efficiency standards for heat pumps manufactured in and after 2006. For example, they
must meet a minimum Seasonally-Adjusted Energy Efficiency Rating (SEER) of 13.6

6

The SEER is a measure of the efficiency of a cooling unit designed to be representative of how the system
performs over the entire cooling season where the outdoor temperature varies. It is calculated as the ratio of cooling
output energy over a season over the input of electrical energy over a season. The Heating Seasonal Performance
Factor (HSPF) is the heating analog of the SEER: It measures the representative heater efficiency over a season. In
practice, both the SEER and HSPF are measured from a test protocol that varies indoor and outdoor temperatures,
and considers compressor type (e.g. single stage, variable), as specified under ANSI/AHRI standard 210/240.
In both cases, a higher rating connotes a more efficient unit that uses less energy to heat or cool. For heat pumps,
HPSF and SEER are very highly correlated.
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In February 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the stimulus package)
re-instated the tax credits, increasing them to 30% of cost, up to a maximum of $1500. The tax
credits were extended to the end of 2010. Many of the tax credits subsequently continued to be
renewed until the end of 2013.
In 2008, the State of Maryland established the EmPower Program, with the goal of
reducing energy consumption by 15% by 2015.7 Participating electric and gas utilities
established a number of initiatives to help meet this goal, including—starting in January 2010—
rebates of $200 and $400 on the purchase of air-source heat pumps in tier I and tier II,
respectively. This rebate structure remained in place for all of 2010 and 2011. In January 2012,
they were revised to $200 and $300 respectively, a rebate of $500 was established for Tier III
air-source heat pumps, and a rebate of $300 was offered for ductless mini-split heat pumps (an
option that requires much less pipe- and ductwork) that met specified efficiency requirements.8
The electric utility serving our study area was one of the participants in the EmPower rebate
program.

3. Study Design and Data Sources
A. Survey Questionnaire
Our survey questionnaire gathered information about energy use at home, including
usage in kWh per month, average bill amount, heating and cooling equipment, fuels, and
attitudes towards conservation and energy efficiency. We also asked respondents whether in the

7

See http://energy.maryland.gov/home.html (last accessed 24 July 2013).
Tier I air source heat pumps have at least 14.5 SEER and 12 EER and 8.2 HSPF. Tier II air-source heat pumps
have at least 15 SEER and 12.5 EER and 8.5 HSPF. Tier III air-source heat pumps have at least 16 SEER and 13
EER and 9 HSPF. A ductless mini-split heat pump must meet the same requirements as a Tier III air-source heat
pump to qualify for the $300 rebate. See http://energy.maryland.gov/facts/empower.html (last accessed 24 July
2013).
8
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last five years they had 1) replaced the heating system, 2) replaced the central air conditioning
system or window units (air conditioning is an important driver of electricity usage in the
summer in the mid-Atlantic region of the US), and 3) installed wall or attic insulation, new
windows, or various other energy-saving purchases.
If so, we further asked them whether they received a rebate or tax credit on this purchase
or cost, how much that rebate or tax credit was for, and which entities provided it (e,g, federal
government, state, etc.). Finally, we asked respondents whether they would have still done those
replacements or installations, had the rebate or tax credit been absent altogether.

B. Universe and Sample
To develop our sample, we combined several sources of data. The first is
MDPropertyView (MDPV), a database that documents all properties in Maryland and is
compiled by the State of Maryland using data from each county. For each dwelling MDPV lists
the premise address, name and address of the owner, and structural characteristics (e.g., size,
single-family or attached home, vintage, construction quality, construction materials, heating and
cooling equipment, etc.). The records are updated annually with any new sale(s) and
modifications in size or structure. We used MDPV to create our universe for the purpose of the
survey, namely owners of single-family homes or townhouses built in 1940 - 2000 who live in
their own homes. We drew a random sample of 6846 addresses from this universe.
Our second source of data is proprietary information from the local electrical utility,
which, since January 2010, has been offering rebates on the purchase of high-efficiency HVAC
equipment, in part to meet its obligations as per the EmPower Maryland program. We selected
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program participants (as of April 2011) who lived in pre-2000 single-family homes or
townhouses, and added these individuals to the sample drawn directly from MDPV.
Finally, we further added households that had moved into pre-2000 homes in the four
counties in January-June 2011 (we purchased this list from a commercial vendor), and pre-2000
homes that had filed for a building permit with the county in 2007-2011, under the assumption
that recent movers and recent renovators may be more likely to undertake energy-efficiency
upgrades in their homes.
In sum, our universe of candidate sampling units were single-family homes and
townhomes built before 2000 and occupied by their owners. Our sampling frame was a mix of
stratified and choice-based sampling (see table 1), which means that it is necessary to calculate
and use appropriate weights when extrapolating sample statistics to the population.9 The
combined sample was comprised of a total of 10,000 households whom we invited to participate
in our survey.

C. Survey Administration
We sent letters to the sample of 10,000 households described above, asking prospective
respondents to visit a dedicated website and complete the questionnaire. A user name and
password were provided to each addressee.
The letters were evenly divided into two waves. The first was mailed in early September
2011, and the second in October 2011. Each mailing was followed by a reminder letter a week
later. The survey was closed on January 4, 2012. We received a total of 1153 completed

9

The weights adjust our samples shares to the population shares. We use the ECSML weights described in Manski
and Lerner (1977), where the ECSML weight wj for an observation in stratum j is equal to Qj/Hj, with Qj the
population share in stratum j and Hj the sample share in stratum j. Manski and Lerner (1977) show that the
maximum likelihood estimates based on the weighted log likelihood function are consistent for the true coefficients.
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questionnaires, and 44 letters were returned to us by the US Postal Service as undeliverable, for a
response rate of 1153/9956=11.58%.10
We conducted follow-ups on subsamples of participants and non-participants in the
summer of 2012. Specifically, we drew a random sample of 500 households that had received the
survey invitation letters back in 2011, but had not filled out the questionnaire. We tracked down
phone numbers for 429, spoke over the phone to 61 of them, and administered them an
abbreviated version of the on-line questionnaire. This group is henceforth termed our summer
2012 “Phase I” sample.
In our summer 2012 “Phase II” survey, we re-contacted all of the 413 households who in
the Fall/Winter 2011 survey had reported changing their heating system within the previous 5
years. We spoke to 104 of them over the phone, and gathered additional information about
equipment, subsidies, and related decisions.

D. Data Available for Analysis
For all of the 10,000 households who were invited to participate in the 2011 survey—
whether or not they actually participated—we have extensive information about the dwelling and
its structural characteristics from MDPV, plus housing stock and resident characteristics at the
census block group from the Census. We also have these households’ monthly electricity meter
readings and bills (provided by the local utility) from December 2007 to April 2012, as well as
the heating degree days (HDDs) and cooling degree days (CDDs) for each billing period.11 We
10

This response rate is within the range typically observed with mail invitations sent to a general population and
web-based questionnaires (see, for example. Kaplowitz et al., 2009; Ramseier, 2013). We examine issues of selfselection into the survey in section 5.
11
We matched each day of each billing period with the Global Surface Summary of the Day records from the
Patuxent Air Naval Station (the weather monitoring station closest to our study area) from the National Climatic
Data Center within the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency, and computed HDDs and CDDs for each
billing period for each respondent using a reference temperature of 65 F (about 18 C). Variation in HDD and CDD
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thus have a panel dataset, with up to 54 electricity meter readings per household, and ample
details about the dwelling, the household, energy efficiency upgrades and renovations, and the
weather.
Household energy-using equipment, expenses, recent replacements, rebate uptake and
energy-efficiency upgrade decisions are available for 1153 of these households. In this paper, we
form samples based on certain subsets of those 1153 respondents. Specifically, we study
households who use exclusively heat pumps for both heating and cooling.
Attention is restricted to heat pumps for three reasons.12 First, they provide heating in the
winter and cooling in the summer, and so households with heat pumps (almost) exclusively use
only one type of energy—electricity—for which we have monthly consumption levels for the
last five years. Second, regulatory standards have resulted in rapid and dramatic improvements in
the energy efficiency of these devices over the last few years, implying that replacing an older
unit with a new one should reduce electricity usage, even when the old one is only 5-6 years old
(Portland General Electric, 2013).13 Third, heat pumps are a common device in the study area,
which does not have access to the natural gas network. Data from MDPV indicate that over 60%
of the pre-2000 single-family homes in our study region use heat pumps.

4. The Model

across respondents and over time comes from the fact that billing periods start and end on different days for different
households.
12
By heat pump, we mean a traditional air-source heat pump or a ductless mini-split heat pump. Ground-source
(geothermal) heat pumps are excluded from this analysis for four reasons. First, there are only 26 households with
geothermal heat pumps in our sample. Second, installing them for the first time in a home may actually increase
electricity usage while decreasing gas and heating oil usage. Third, all of the 26 households that installed a
geothermal heat pump in the five years prior to the main survey of this paper received incentives. Fourth, the cost of
geothermal systems is much higher than that of air-source or ductless mini-split heat pumps, and so are the relevant
tax credits and rebates.
13
See http://www.portlandgeneral.com/residential/energy_savings/getting_started/energy_cost_calculator.aspx (last
accessed 30 July 2013).
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A. Theoretical Considerations
Decisions about energy-using capital and energy usage are usually represented assuming
a two-stage utility maximization process. In the first stage, the household chooses the level of
consumption of other goods and the desired level of “energy services” (e.g., thermal comfort). In
the second stage, the household chooses the combination of capital stock K and energy use E that
minimizes expenditure for any given level of energy services. At the optimum, the slope of the
isoquant representing the possible combinations of capital and energy for any given technology
is equal to the ratio of capital and energy prices.
To illustrate the effects of energy efficiency standards, consider a household who must
replace their heat pump, and assume for the sake of simplicity that the household wishes to stay
with the same thermal comfort S0. In figure 1, the old technology is represented by the upper
isoquant and point A represents the old heat pump. New heat pumps are required to meet more
stringent efficiency standards, and are represented by isoquants like the one with points B and C:
For any level of capital, thermal comfort is the same as before, but energy usage is less.
If prices are unchanged, the new optimum might be point B, which implies less energy
usage than before. If, however, more efficient equipment is more expensive, the household may
substitute energy for capital, and, depending on prices and substitution possibilities, may even
end up using more energy than before. Tax credits that are proportional to the cost of capital tend
counter this effect, since they lower the cost per unit of capital, making the isocost line steeper
and raising its intercept.14 In Figure 1, the energy efficiency at point C is higher than that at B,
which in turn is higher than A.15

14

In practice, tax credits are usually capped at a certain level, but we ignore this aspect in this simplified framework.
Energy services are the same and are equal to S0, so energy efficiency, which we define as S0/E (the reciprocal of
the energy needed per unit of energy service), is clearly highest at C.
15
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The outcomes are even more difficult to predict if we allow for the household to revisit
the choice of optimal thermal comfort and/or offer a lump-sum incentive, such as a rebate.
Better energy efficiency reduces the price per unit of energy service, and may engender a
combination of substitution and income effect known as the rebound effect (Dimitropolous and
Sorrell, 2007), with households purchasing more energy services. A rebate is an income transfer
that shifts the isocost line outward, and may result in higher consumption of other goods and/or
energy services. Depending on the available isoquants and prices of inputs, the households may
choose to consume more or less energy than before.
This simple framework assumes that incentives are exogenously assigned to individual.
In real life, however, individuals seek them out and thus self-select into them. It seems plausible
that persons who apply for incentives—whether or not they “free ride”—might be more aware
about energy efficiency, more productive at combining capital and energy to produce energy
services (which means that they would be looking at a different set of isoquants), and face
different input prices. If this is the case, they may choose higher efficiency and lower energy
usage than non-incentive households.
It is also possible that some individuals may purchase energy-efficient products because
their awareness was raised by the incentive itself or the existence of incentive programs (“free
drivers,” see Gillingham and Palmer, 2013), or that some individuals might derive utility from
knowing that they are contributing to the public good through their CO2 emissions reductions.
In sum, households will select optimal levels of energy services, capital and energy, and
the associated energy efficiency level, but unless we have extensive information about prices,
technologies and preferences, it is difficult to predict these choices and how they are affected by
incentives. The lack of unambiguous predictions requires that we turn to empirical work to see if
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installing new higher-efficiency equipment and receiving incentives influence the choice of
energy efficiency, capital and energy usage. We also see if decisions and behaviors are affected
by the type and amount of the incentive, and/or are different for those individuals whom we
identify as likely free riders. We use extensive utility-provided usage data and survey-based
information about the efficiency choices of the households in our sample to answer these
questions.

B. Econometric Model
One major goal of this paper is to examine household energy consumption when existing
equipment is replaced with a newer, and more energy efficient, device. We use a difference-indifference approach and the “treatment” is the replacement of a heat pump with a new one during
the last five years. Our estimation sample is comprised of observations from this treatment group
and observations from a control group (households who have a heat pump, but did not replace it
in the last five years).16 We have monthly electricity usage records spanning December 2007 to
April 2013.
The model is
(1)

ln Eit   i   ln DDaysit   (ln DDaysit  Winterit )  M it δ    HEATTREATit   it

where i denotes the household, t the billing period, E is the electricity usage in kWh in billing
period t, DDays is the sum of heating degree days and cooling degree days during that billing

16

We exclude from our sample households whose recently installed heat pumps replaced a heater that uses a
different type of fuel (electricity bills would rise for these households, since now electricity is used for heating and
cooling, and not just for lighting and appliances). We also exclude the 26 households in our sample with geothermal
pumps.
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period, Winter is a dummy denoting the winter months, M is a set of month-by-year dummies,17
 is the vector of associated effects, and HEATTREAT is a dummy that takes on a value of one
when the new heating pump is installed.
We are especially interested in , the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT),
which measures the percentage change in energy use that occurs when a heat pump is replaced
with a new, and presumably more efficient, one. We note that equation (1) is a reduced-form
equation that cannot disentangle the extent of the rebound effect (if any). Based on existing
literature (Greening et al., 2000; Davis, 2008; Sorrell et al., 2009; Linares and Labandeira, 2010;
Gillingham et al., 2013), we do not expect any rebound effect to be so strong as to completely
erode the technological efficiency gains. We therefore expect  to be negative.18
Equation (1) includes household-specific fixed effects, which address the potential
endogeneity of the decision to replace the heat pump as long as any unobservable house or
household characteristics that influence both this decision and electricity consumption are
approximately constant over time. In the remainder of the paper, we report results based on the
“within” estimator, but for good measure also re-ran our models using a first-difference
estimation approach, and got virtually identical results. We report t statistics based on standard
errors clustered at the household level.

17

All of the household in our study area face the same electricity price, which varied little during the study period.
We therefore let M capture any effects on demand due to changes in prices. The utility applies a two-part tariff, with
a fixed fee plus a constant price per kWh (in other words, they do not apply block pricing).
18
Greening et al. (2000) notes that many early studies may have overstated the rebound effect because of their
reliance on engineering-predicted energy savings, and that others simply did not meet minimum study quality
criteria or did not account for changing equipment, etc. They also note that the rebound effect will depend on the
level of awareness that consumers during energy service consumption. For example, consumers are aware of the
ambient temperature, thermal comfort and heating fuel bill, but pay less attention to the utilization of a refrigerator.
Greening et al’s estimate the rebound effect to be 10 and 30% for residential heating. Sorrel et al. (2009) suggest
best-guess estimates of the long-run direct rebound effect of 10-30% for residential heating and 1-26% for
residential cooling. In Davis (2008), the rebound effect for clothes washers is very small. Linares and Labandeira’s
argument is based on the low elasticity of residential demand for electricity.
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The difference-in-difference approach rests on the assumption that treatment and control
units have a common trend (if any). We test whether they do—at least before the “treatment”
(replacement of the heat pump)—by estimating a slightly simplified version of equation (1),
namely
(2) ln Eit   i   ln DDaysit   (ln DDaysit  Winterit )  mit δ1    t    (t  TGi )  eit ,
where TG denotes that the household is a “changer” and is thus part of the treatment group, and
m is a vector of month dummies, using a sample that contains the controls and the “changers”
before they change their heat pumps. We test the null that  is zero. Failure to reject the null
implies that there is no evidence of different trends, at least before the treatment.
Equations (1) and (2) assume that the proportional effect of changing the heat pump is the
same for all households. We check for heterogeneous effects by adding interactions between the
treatment dummy and i) dwelling or household characteristics, ii) an incentive-received dummy,
and iii) (log) incentive amount. We also construct alternate samples that includes only the
controls and the incentive recipients, or only the controls and the non-incentive changers.
We do not have any prior expectations on the signs and magnitude of the coefficients on
ii) and iii) above. If households attracted into rebate programs are systematically more
productive at saving electricity than others (Joskow and Marron, 1992), and we do a good job
capturing this heterogeneity with household-specific fixed effects, then there is no particular
reason why the treatment effect should be different for them. On the other hand, it is possible
that program participants are more productive with the new technology, or better aware of new
technologies, or that the efficiency requirements that they must meet to qualify for the incentive
are sufficiently stringent to make a difference. And finally, it is possible that incentive itself
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makes incentive recipients more aware about efficiency and energy usage—and they end up
using less energy.
Greening et al. (2000) and Sorrell et al. (2009) discuss the possibility that the effects of
efficient technologies may vary with the technology’s share of total energy bills, thermal comfort
and sensitivity to it, and opportunities to adjust the rate of utilization of the technology. With
space heating, for example, “temperature take-back” (adjustment in internal temperature in the
home, which is accounted for in part by the physical characteristics of the dwelling and in part by
behaviors) for example, may be greater among low-income households, or in developing
countries.
These considerations suggest that we should check if the effects of the incentives vary
across light and heavy users. We accomplish this with fixed-effects quantile regressions. We
adopt Canay’s (2011) representation
(3)

Pr(Yit  x it β( )   i | x it ,  i )   ,

where  denotes a specific quantile, Y is log usage, x is the set of right-hand side variables in
equation (1), as well his assumptions, which imply that the fixed effects do not depend on  and
are present in the conditional expectation of Yit:
(4)

Yit  x it β( )   i  uit ,

where  denotes the mean.
The simple two-step estimator proposed by Canay transforms the dependent variable into

Yit  ̂ i , where ̂ i is the estimated fixed effects from “within” estimation, and then applies
conventional quantile regression to the transformed dependent variable. Canay shows that this
two-step estimator of the slopes is consistent at the usual rate and asymptotically normal when n
(here, the number of households) and T (here, the number of billing periods) go to infinity.
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5. The Data
A. The Main Survey Sample
We begin this section with a brief description of the 1153 people that filled out the main
survey questionnaire in the fall and winter of 2011. In terms of education and income, 27.32%
of the respondents has a college degree and 60% reports that household income is above
$120,000 a year. The median home size is 1856 square feet. Based on the utility electricity
records, the median electricity usage is about 1400 kWh per billing period (about 16,800 kWh a
year, and a monthly bill of about $250). This heavy usage (the statewide average in 2011 was
about 12,000 kWh19) is in part explained by the large share of homes that rely on heat pumps for
heating and cooling (hence the lack of another fuel to serve the energy load).
Table 2 shows that out of 1153 respondents, 413 (35.82%) replaced their heating system
over the last five years. Using weights that account for choice-based sampling, the population
rate is 30.41%, which corresponds to an annual rate of 6.08%. We computed the replacement
rate for the South mid-Atlantic region (which includes our survey area) using the micro data
from the 2009 Residential Energy Consumption Survey, and find it comforting that it is 6% per
year (over 2005-09).
Table 2 also shows that heat pumps are common in our sample: They account for about
50% of the sample, and about half of them were replaced in the last five years.20 Sixty percent of

19

See http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=97&t=3 (last accessed 30 July 2013).
MPV indicates that about 60% of the 1940-2000 homes in our study area use heat pumps. For comparison, the US
Department of Energy reports that in the southern Mid-Atlantic states heat pumps are used in 20% of the homes, but
that figure reflects primarily the urban areas of Maryland, Virginia, the District of Columbia and Delaware, and
piped natural gas (the most common heating fuel in the US) is not available in our study region. See the 2009
Residential Energy Consumption Survey, available at
http://www.eia.gov/consumption/residential/data/2009/#undefined (last accessed 27 April 2013).
20
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the replacements received incentives.21 Since many incentives were specifically targeted at heat
pump and geothermal systems, it is not surprising that the rate at which incentives were received
is higher for these two types of heating technologies than for other types (e.g., propane gas and
heating oil).
The median cost (before incentives) of a new heating system in the sample is $5,000
($6,000 if a rebate or tax credit was received, $3,500 otherwise, $5,500 for heat pumps, and
$26,500 for geothermal systems). Almost 56% of those that replaced the heating system availed
themselves of a “tax credit or rebate from the federal or state government, the utility or the
manufacturer.” For almost 40% of them, the rebate or tax credit was in excess of $500. In fact,
27% received a rebate of $1000 or more. We were able to obtain the exact rebate or tax credit
amount from 45 respondents whom we re-contacted during Phase II in the summer of 2012. For
this group, the rebate or tax credit ranged from $1,000 to $17,000; the mean was $3,137 and the
median was $2,000 (see Figure 2).
Appendix A displays the results of a probit model evaluating the impact of observables
on the likelihood of receiving a rebate. The sample is restricted to those who replaced their
heating system, and the dependent variable is whether they received an incentive for it. Most
dwelling characteristics have little or no explanatory power. Even more important, the only
variables that are significantly associated with receiving an incentive are the size of the home,
income and household size, and the presence of a heat pump, which are also determinants of a
household’s demand for electricity.22

B. Selection into the Sample
21

By incentive, we mean a tax credit and/or state- or utility-offered rebate.
This means that, for lack of a valid exclusion restriction, we cannot rely on an instrumental variable approach to
estimate the average treatment effect of receiving a rebate.
22
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One concern with the above statistics is that they might be affected by sample-selection
bias, so that they do not mirror the true rates in the population of pre-2000, owner-occupied
single-family homes and townhomes. We checked for possible sample selection bias using three
different approaches.
First, we compared dwelling characteristics and Census-based summaries of the local
populations across participants (N=1153) and non-participating households (N=99561153=8803). The results of the corresponding t tests are displayed in the table in Appendix B.23
We found that participants have slightly larger homes and tend to live in neighborhoods with
higher incomes and higher shares of White-Caucasian residents, but the differences are modest,
even when they are statistically significant (first and second panels of the table). Even more
important, participation does not depend on the type of heating system (bottom panel of the
data). Electricity consumption per billing period is higher among survey participants, but the
difference is only 4%. At the same time, electricity intensity (i.e., average usage per billing
period divided by the square footage of the home) is slightly lower among participants, due to
their larger homes.
Second, we estimated a probit model where the dependent variable is a dummy denoting
survey questionnaire completion, and the main independent variable is electricity usage per
square foot (Appendix C, specifications (i)-(ii)). We found that this measure of energy intensity
is negatively and significantly associated with the likelihood of participation, but in practice the
impact of intensity is very small and has little explanatory power.24 Augmenting this probit with

23

These are unpaired t tests that assume unequal variances.
Increasing energy intensity by one standard deviation above the sample mean reduces the probability of
participating in the survey by 1.27 percentage points, bringing it from 11.82% to 10.55%. Increasing it by two
standard deviations reduces the likelihood of participation by 2.4 percentage points above the sample mean, bringing
it to 9.37%.
24
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additional regressors (house characteristics, neighborhood characteristics) does little to improve
the fit of the model (Appendix C, specification (iii)).
Third, in the summer of 2012 we drew a random sample of 500 households that had
received the survey invitation letters back in 2011, but had not filled out the questionnaire. We
found phone numbers for 429 and managed to speak to 61 over the phone. The rate at which
these households had replaced their heating system since 2007, and resorted to rebates or tax
credits, were virtually identical to those reported by the 1153 households in the 2011 survey.25
Taken together, these findings suggest that if there is selection into the sample, it is probably not
very important for the purposes of our analysis.

C. Usage and Energy Efficiency Comparisons
In the remainder of this paper we use the billing and usage data, and other information,
from N=70 of the households who changed their heat pumps between 2007 and 2011, and from
whom we were able to get detailed information about the time of this change and the features of
the new heat pump.26 We supplement this sample with N=394 households with heat pumps who
had not changed them in the previous five years. Because electricity billing has an approximately
monthly frequency, and we have usage and billing records from December 2007 to April 2012,
the electricity consumption readings form a panel dataset with up to T=53 observations per
household.
Our first order of business is to check if the controls are similar to the treatment group
(those who have changed their heat pump in the last five years) prior to the treatment (replacing
25

Specifically, 33% of these 61 former non-participants replaced the heating system over the last 5 years, and 55%
received an incentive when they did so. The percentages in the 2011 wave were 35.82% and 56%, respectively.
26
This additional and detailed information was obtained during Phase II in the Summer 2012. We re-contacted all of
the 411 households who had reported changing their heating system in five years prior to the 2011 survey. We
managed to interview N=104 of them.
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the heat pump). Before changing the heat pump, the average usage of electricity per billing
period in our treatment group was 1,776 kWh, whereas that in the control group was 1,650
kWh.27 The corresponding log usage statistics are 7.3635 and 7.2424. Formal t-test results based
on log usage and other measures are reported in table 3.28 These results show that households
who changed their heat pump in the last five years tended to use more electricity per billing
period before changing the heat pump than the controls. Log intensity (where intensity is usage
divided by square feet) is roughly the same in the two groups. Table 4 displays information about
house and household characteristics for the treatment and control groups, showing that treatment
households are wealthier and “older” than the control households, and live in larger homes.
Treatment and control groups, however, live in homes of similar vintages, construction materials,
and types. 29
About 69% of those who changed their heat pump reported receiving an incentive on this
purchase. A federal tax credit was present (alone or in conjunction with other incentives) in 62%
of these cases. We check whether—prior to the treatment—those households that received a
rebate or a tax credit are similar to those that changed their heat pump but did not receive an
incentive (table 5). If anything, incentive recipients use somewhat less electricity in total than
non-recipients, but the difference is not statistically significant, and consume significantly less on
a per square foot basis. Taken together, the results in tables 3 and 5 confirm that it is appropriate

27

As we describe in more detail below, these statistics are based on accounts that were active at the time of the main
survey and Phase II follow-up in the summer of 2012. The sample is restricted to households with heat pumps and is
limited to billing periods with length between 28 and 33 days. We reminder the reader that we excluded households
who changed heat pump between 2007 and 2012, but in doing so replaced heating equipment that used a different
fuel.
28
Because observations within a household may be correlated over time, we first computed averages for each
households. The t tests reported in tables 3 and 4 use a single figure per household—the household’s average over
time.
29
Dwelling “vintage” or cohort effects have been found to be important determinants of residential energy use in
other studies (Cost and Kahn, 2011). We don’t expect such effects to be at play here, given that the control and
treatment groups are similar in terms of construction year.
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for our econometric models to include household-specific fixed effects, and also suggest that
there is no particular reason to expect that the treatment effect should be very different across
incentive and non-incentive “replacers.”
Incentive recipients and non-recipients also appear to be similar in terms of the energy
efficiency of the equipment they bought. In Phase II we asked respondents to report the cost and
describe certain technical aspects of their new heat pumps. For some of those who did not report
the SEER of their heat pumps, we were able to recover information from the rebate paperwork
filed with the utility. We thus estimate that the average SEER of the new heat pump is 14.69 for
those who did not receive an incentive, and 15.47 among those who did. These figures are very
close, indicating only a slightly higher efficiency among incentive takers. As shown in table 6,
the median, mean, maximum and indeed the entire distribution of the cost of the new heat pump
is virtually identical across these two groups of respondents.

D. Reasons for Replacing a Heat Pump
In Phase II we also asked all “changers” to tell us the reasons for replacing their heat
pumps. Table 7 shows clearly that main reason is that the old heat pump broke or “was aging,”
especially among incentive recipients (89% v. 77% among non-recipients).
Only two out of 22 incentive recipients indicated that “there were offered a rebate or a tax
credit” without also selecting the response options “the old one broke” or “the old one was
aging.” Quite a few incentive recipients—about 42%—also said that the “old one was
inadequate.” When asked what they would have done in the absence of the rebate or tax credit,
most of them (71%) told us they would have bought exactly the same model, 15% said they
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would have bought a less expensive model, and only about 5% said they would have bought a
less efficient system (table 8).
Based on this evidence, it appears that free-riding is pervasive in our sample. If we use a
restrictive definition of free rider—a household who replaced the heat pump because it was
broken or aging, and would have bought exactly the same model in the absence of the incentive-about 50% of our incentive-takers are free riders. If we use a broader definition (they replaced
the heat pump because it was broken or aging, but still took the incentive), then 89% of them are
free riders.
Those who did not receive incentives generally weren’t sure why they did not apply for
the incentives (5 respondents), were not aware of the existence of the incentives (6), claimed
(incorrectly) that the incentives were not available at the time they replaced their heat pumps (5),
or simply did not want to deal with the related paperwork or found the rebate too small to bother
(total 2 persons).
One question at the heart of this paper, which we examine in the next section, is whether
electricity usage is reduced just as much among incentive recipients as among persons who
changed their heat pump without a rebate or tax credits. In other words, given the predominance
of free riding, are the incentive takers at least as productive at reducing electricity usage as the
other replacers? This question is all the more important for policy purposes when we consider
that many of our incentive takers appear to be free riders.

6. Results
A. Sample Construction and Preliminary Checks
In our regressions, the sample is comprised of monthly usage readings from households
who did and did not change their heat pumps between 2007 and 2011. Attention is restricted to
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accounts that were active at the time of the fall/winter 2011 survey, and to households that
clearly replaced an existing electric heat pump with a new one. We therefore exclude
households whose previous heating systems used a different fuel or who fail to report whether
there was a fuel switch. We also exclude the 26 households with geothermal systems.
Since we use a difference-in-difference approach, our first order of business is to check
that pre-treatment trends are the same for the treatment and control groups. We use two
approaches. First, we compute mean log usage by month for control and treatment households
before the treatment, which we plot in Figure 3. The graph shows that, as expected, there are
obvious seasonal patterns in electricity consumption for both groups of households. There is no
obvious evidence of a trend, and the two groups track each other closely, with the (future)
changers generally above the non-changers. This could be because the former’s equipment is
older and less efficient, or because they have larger homes (see table 4), or because they are
generally heavy users due to preference and household composition.
Our second approach is to estimate equation (2) using observations from the controls and
the heat pump changers before the change. We find no evidence of a trend ( ˆ = 0.001185, t
statistic 1.24) or of a systematically different trend across changers and non-changers ( ̂ = 0.0004913, with a t statistic of -0.15).

B. Results from the Difference-in-Difference Approach
We report the results of regression (1) in table 9. This regression uses our broadest
“clean” sample. If a household changed the heat pump in the last five years, and reported the
year of the change, but not the exact month, we simply exclude all of the observations from the
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year of the change (“dropme=0”). The results show that electricity use is well predicted by
weather and time of the year, and that a new heat pump reduces electricity usage by almost 8%.
In table 10 we explore the robustness of this result with respect to various criteria for
constructing or further cleaning the sample. For example, row (A) refers to the same model as in
table 6, but here our control group includes only households who haven’t changed their heat
pump in the last five years, and haven’t installed or replaced insulation, windows, or otherwise
improved the thermal integrity of their homes. The average treatment effect is virtually the same.
Rows (B)-(D) of table 10 show that the results are robust to, and get somewhat
statistically stronger with, dropping two households who were found to have done additions to
their homes, further excluding a household with a photovoltaic system, and further dropping
observations from the last two months for which we have usage and billing data.
In table 11 we look for possible evidence of heterogeneity in the ATT. For simplicity, we
have entered one interaction at a time in equation (1). The electricity demand reduction
associated with replacing a heat pump ranges from 0 to 16%. The strongest effects are observed
for homes built before 1990, larger homes, households with persons aged 65 and older, and
homes with attic insulation.

C. The Effect of Incentives
In table 12 we investigate whether the ATT depends on energy efficiency incentives. We
begin with creating a sample that is comprised of the controls and the changers who did not
receive incentives. The results of this run are striking: The ATT is now much stronger, for an
estimated reduction in electricity usage of 16%. The associated t statistic is -3.02.
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We swap non-rebaters with rebaters in row (B), and the results are starkly different: The
reduction in electricity consumption is virtually nil for those who received an incentive. We get
similar results if we restrict the sample to households who received a rebate, which means we are
comparing their own pre- and post-change usage. This approach produces an estimate of  equal
to 0.6% (t statistic 0.15). By contrast, in the no-rebate-only sample the estimated treatment effect
is a 14.32% reduction in usage (t statistic -2.90).
In row (C) of table 12 we pool changers and control units, but include in the model an
interaction between the treatment dummy and receiving an incentive. “Natural” changers reduce
usage by 16.74% (t stat. -3.28) while incentive recipients only by 3.5% (t stat -1.02), which
confirms the results in rows (A) and (B). When we distinguish for the source of the incentive
(rows (D) and (E)) it would seem that recipients of federal tax credits accomplish more
substantial electricity usage reductions that the rest of the incentive takers. This result is
consistent with the theoretical considerations in section 4, but these results should be interpreted
with caution because most incentive takers appeared to combine incentives from different
sources, and because the relevant coefficient in row (D) is insignificant at the conventional
levels.
We experimented with different ways of entering the actual rebate amount in the
model—linearly, as a share of the cost of the new heat pump along with the cost of the heat
pump, summarized into broad categories, etc.—and the results generally agree with the notion
that the larger the rebate, the less important the effect on electricity consumption. For example,
row (F) in table 12 includes the treatment dummy and its interaction with the log of rebate
amount. The coefficients indicate that electricity consumption decreases by 15.86% among nonrebate takers (t stat-3.11), by 6.22% (t stat -.1.97) among those who received a $300 rebate, by
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5.5% when the rebate is $450 (t stat -1.66) and by insignificant amounts (3% or less) for rebates
of $1,000 or more.
We checked if these results vary with house size or income (by using three-way
interactions between HEATTREAT, the rebate dummy or log rebate, and a high income/large
house dummy, or by restricting the high/low income or large/small house households), but found
that they don’t.30 Normalizing usage by the size of the home does not change these results.
That usage actually increases (if weakly) with the size of the incentive points to two
possibilities: That this effect is due to the free riders, which might be insensitive to the incentive
amount, or to persons who are upsizing their system, for whom the larger the incentive, the
greater the post-change usage. In table 13 we run regressions after excluding from the sample
persons who meet our strictest definition of free rider (replaced a broken or aging system, and
would have purchased the same model even in the absence of the incentive), persons who
replaced a broken and/or aging system, and persons who stated they changed the old heat pump
because it was “inadequate.”
The ATT of changing the heat pump is stronger when we exclude observations from
these persons, suggesting that the free riders in our sample do worse, in terms of electricity usage
reduction, than the households who changed their heat pump without an incentive. Dropping

30

We also examined a possible technical explanation. Electric heat pumps do not perform particularly well at cold
temperatures (below 37 F), and so many households in our study region have a propane gas “back-up” which can
be deployed on very cold days. If for some reason the households who received incentives purchased units that
perform better at low temperatures and reduce reliance on back-up fuel on particularly cold days, then they might
still have reduced overall energy use, even though their electricity consumption has not decreased. We checked the
description of the heat pump technology reported by our interviewees, and gas back-ups are just as common among
incentive and non-incentive households. We also tested the abovementioned conjecture by adding a two-way
interaction between the treatment dummy and the winter season, plus a three-way interaction between the treatment
dummy, incentive or log incentive amount, and a winter dummy. The regression results indicate that the effect of
changing the heat pump are uniform across seasons for both incentive and non-incentive households. We conclude
that technical differences in the equipment are unlikely to be driving our results.
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these groups from the usable sample, however, does little to the estimated slope of log incentive,
which is similar to the base model in table 10.

D. Fixed-Effects Quantile Regressions
We plot in Figure 4 the coefficients on the treatment dummy, HEATTREAT, for selected
quantiles  from fixed effects quantile regressions with the same right-hand side variables as
equation (1) and table 6. The results indicate that, conditional on the covariates, the effect of
changing the heat pump is smallest and statistically insignificant at the lowest quantiles—namely
the 10th and 12.5th (0.000236, t statistic 0.004, and -0.0079, t statistic -0.17).31 By about the 40th
percentile, the coefficient is -0.0582 (t statistic -3.296). The coefficient is very stable (about 0.07 to -0.08) for percentiles greater than the 50th, although it is not statistically significant at the
top quantiles.
When we enter the interaction of HEATTREAT with the incentive dummy, the fixed
effects quantile regressions (summarized in Figure 5) suggest that households who did not
receive incentives reduced electricity usage by no less than 10%, even at the lowest quantiles
conditionally on the covariates. The largest reductions are observed at the 50th percentile (about
14% reduction). At the high percentiles the electricity demand reduction are similar to those at
the low percentile. The story is completely different for households that received incentives:
Except for the highest percentiles, these households appear to have increased usage. At the low
usage percentiles, conditionally on the covariates, electricity usage actually increases by almost
16%.
Figure 6 displays the effect of treatment on log electricity demand for selected incentive
values. At zero incentive, the effects at different percentiles are similar to those for non31

The t statistics are based on bootstrapped standard errors.
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incentive changers shown in Figure 5. At $450, households in the 10th percentile increase usage
by about 11%. The effect becomes smaller as we increase, and by the 90th percentile usage
decreases by about 6%. The pattern is similar for a $1000 incentive, where the bottom 10% and
the top 10% of the distribution of usage, conditional on the covariates, experience a 14%
increase and 5% increase, respectively. The effect is positive but small at the other quantiles.

7. Conclusions
We have developed a unique dataset based on an original survey of households,
combined with data on home characteristics and neighborhood location, as well as monthly
electricity usage records, utility program participation, and other sources, and used it to
investigate three key questions about energy-efficiency upgrades and the role of energyefficiency incentives. We have focused on heat pumps and have used a difference-in-difference
estimation approach where the dependent variable is the log of energy usage in a billing period.
We account for unobservables (and thus the possible endogeneity of the decision to change the
heat pump and/or apply for an incentive on the purchase) using household-specific fixed effects.
We have found that replacing an existing heat pump with a new one does indeed reduce
electricity usage. The average treatment effect on the treated is an 8% reduction, the effect being
more pronounced for households with larger homes, for homes with insulation, and in
households with elderly persons.
From a policy perspective the more important question is whether households who have
received energy-efficiency incentives reduce usage to a different extent than the others. Free
riding is pervasive in our sample (50-89% of incentive recipients), but we have no a priori reason
to believe that free riders are any worse at reducing energy usage. Moreover, incentive takers
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and non-takers are similar in terms of the manufacturer-specified energy efficiency rating and
expenditure on their new heat pumps.
What we find here is striking: The average treatment effect is a 16% electricity usage
reduction among non-recipients, and virtually nil among incentive recipients. Further controlling
for the rebate amount suggests that the larger the rebate, the smaller (in absolute value) the
reduction in electricity usage. At $1000 and more, there are virtually no reductions in usage. This
happens despite the fact that rebate takers and the other households who changed their heat
pumps are similar in terms of the efficiency and the cost of the new equipment they purchase.
While non-incentive households deliver CO2 emissions reductions in a cost-effective
fashion, 32 only for very low incentive amounts would cost effectiveness be reasonable for
incentive takers. For a $450 incentive, for example, each ton of CO2 reduced costs $68.05. The
cost increases quickly as the incentive is raised.
Our results appear to be driven by the numerous free riders in our sample (50-89% of
those who received an incentive, depending on the definition of free rider) as well as by those
who most likely upsized their system, since the old one was “inadequate.” Quantile regressions
show that rebate takers at lowest end of the distribution of electricity usage, conditionally on the
covariates, actually increase usage after they replace their heat pumps. If our findings are
correctly interpreted as an instance of the rebound effect, then it is a surprisingly strong rebound
effect—and one that is driven by the cost of the durable equipment, rather than the price of
electricity or energy efficiency per se, since households who did not take incentive experience a
net reduction in electricity usage.

32

Assuming an equipment lifetime of 10 years, and 0.608 kg CO2 emissions avoided per kWh saved, the cost per
metric ton of CO2 removed is $23.50, which is in line with social cost of carbon figures typically used by the US
Environmental Protection Agency in its analyses (Greenstone et al., 2013).
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This highlights an additional unintended consequence of offering energy-efficiency
incentives—one that is potentially worse than free riding per se: The possibility that with certain
types of equipment, and for a non-negligible share of the universe targeted by the rebates—the
rebate or tax credit is utilized to upgrade the system size or increase utilization, with little or no
impact on overall usage or emissions. In other words, the rebate dollars are financing an increase
in household utility with little societal benefit.
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Appendix A. Determinants of receiving rebates or tax credits: Probit model. Dep. Var.: rebate.
Fall/Winter 2011 survey respondents who had changed their heating system within the last 5
years.
add expectation
house
add household
that electricity
characteristics
characteristics
prices will increase
coeff
t stat coeff
t stat Coeff
t stat
_cons
-0.51943 -0.89
0.056599 0.09
0.016424 0.02
sqftstrc
0.000932 2.06
0.000808 1.65
0.000797 1.63
sqftstrc2
-1.92E-07
-2
-1.60E-07 -1.55
-1.58E-07 -1.53
floors
-0.03487 -0.21
-0.05218
-0.3
-0.05172
-0.3
townhome
-0.07236 -0.23
0.121317 0.33
0.071713
0.2
heatpump
0.307127 2.14
0.210409 1.38
0.219116 1.45
average
-0.14334 -0.82
-0.16025 -0.87
-0.1642 -0.89
Good
0.09514 0.34
0.049573 0.17
0.053325 0.18
Brick
0.277868 1.16
0.27281 1.05
0.284656 1.09
frame
-0.07054 -0.39
0.02166 0.11
0.033758 0.18
houseage
-0.0159 -2.48
-0.01591 -2.34
-0.01538 -2.26
income_120plus
0.339757 2.33
0.357009 2.45
somecollege
0.019737 0.11
0.03467
0.2
collegegrad
0.083133 0.53
0.100262 0.63
nperson
-0.17689 -3.43
-0.18141 -3.53
willincrease
0.045789 0.33
log L
-269.473
-243.144
-244.434
N
413
395
387
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Appendix B. Determinants of participation in the main survey: t tests.

variable
description
Dwelling characteristics
lsqft
yearblt
townhome
brick
frame
average quality
good quality
fair quality
basement
floors
Neighborhood characteristics
pct_White
pct_AfAm
pct_Asian
pct_Other
pct_Hisp
pct_Col2
pct_ge65yr
pct_le_5yr
Pct_DU_a90
Med_Inc
Electricity usage
kWh per billing period
mean_usage08
(month) in 2008
intensity
Mean_usage08/sqft
intmissing
intensity missing
MPV_heat_heatpump heat pump
MPV_heat_electric
electric heat
MPV_heat_hotwater
boiler
MPV_heat_hotair
furnace
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participant=0 participant=1 t stat

Difference
significant
at 5%?

7.4305
1985.46
0.1129
0.0825
0.1636
0.5798
0.0850
0.2993
0.4414
1.6543

7.5131
1984.56
0.0668
0.0971
0.1674
0.6140
0.0980
0.2523
0.4844
1.6626

-7.27
1.87
5.70
-1.59
-0.32
-2.24
-1.40
3.42
-2.59
-0.54

Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No

74.2013
20.6633
1.6144
3.5271
2.0686
22.4654
8.1631
7.1017
32.6704
63,276.71

76.3938
18.6756
1.6002
3.3183
1.9817
23.4579
8.4623
6.8369
31.2064
65,030.62

-5.22
5.31
0.40
4.45
1.98
-4.50
-2.79
5.85
3.30
-4.88

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Marginal
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

1402.28
0.9140
0.0575
0.6221
0.0416
0.0282
0.2974

1460.69
0.8637
0.0442
0.6214
0.0450
0.0381
0.2966

-2.72
3.78
2.02
0.42
-0.54
-1.67
0.05

Yes
Yes
Marginal
No
No
No
No
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Appendix C. Determinants of participation in the survey: Probit models of participation.
(i)
all delivered letters
coeff

t stat

(ii) only households
with intensity data
(intmissing==0)
coeff

t stat

(iii)
all delivered letters
coeff

t stat

_cons

-1.06467

-27.66

-0.79386

-11.53

-1.91258

-7.23

intensity

-0.13927

-3.55

-0.17272

-4.32

-0.0823

-1.78

intmissing

-0.26652

-3.19

-0.20405

-2.33

-0.22308

-2.13

round of survey
sqftstrc

0.000415

4.18

sqft2

-5.85E-08

-2.96

vintage5060

0.062879

0.45

vintage6070

-0.08557

-0.66

vintage7080

0.192867

1.63

vintage8090

0.067567

0.57

vintage9000

0.106941

0.71

-0.1336

-1.99

brick

-0.21436

-1.64

vinyl

-0.19454

-1.59

frame

-0.19584

-1.56

Med_Inc

3.61E-06

2.27

Pct_White

0.005915

3.72

Pct_Hisp

0.019326

1.4

share_hotwater

-0.09364

-0.2

share_heatpump

-0.0321

-0.35

townhome

log L
N

-3560.92

-3379.23

-3492.6

9956

9399

9952
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Figure 1. Optimal choice of energy-using equipment.
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Figure 2. Rebates or tax credits received for replacing the heating system. Sample: Fall/Winter
2011 survey respondents who changed their heating system within the last 5 years. N=413.
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Figure 3. Mean log electricity usage for control group and treatment group before the treatment
(i.e., changing the heat pump).
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Figure 4. Average treatment effect on the treated from fixed effects quantile regression.
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Figure 5. Average treatment effect on the treated from fixed effects quantile regression. Model
with interaction between heat pump treatment dummy and incentive dummy.
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Figure 6. Average treatment effect on the treated from fixed effect quantile regression. Model
with heat pump treatment dummy and log incentive.
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Table 1. Summary of original sampling plan (addressees of letters with invitation to participate
in the survey).
N
Homes built 1940-2000

6846

participants in utility rebate and audit programs,
homes built 1940-2000
recent movers (Jan-Jun 2011), homes built 1940-2000

1143
1171

renovators (building permit filed 2007-2011, homes
built 1940-2000)
total

840
10000

Table 2. Heating and cooling equipment in the main survey.

Type

Any
Heat pump
Geothermal
(n=26)
Other

% of
sample
from
main
survey

%
%
rebate if
changed
changed
in last 5
last 5
years
years

100.00
50.13

35.82
49.13

55.69
60.21

2.25

69.23

100.00

47.61

20.22

36.94
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Table 3. Electricity usage comparison between controls and treatment households before the
treatment. (Respondents with active accounts, who replace electric heat pumps with electric heat
pumps.)

mean usage
mean log usage
mean log usage day
mean log usage foot

control treatment t
group
group
statstic
1650.36
1775.53
-1.37
7.2424
7.3635
-1.95
3.8338
3.8791
-1.05
-0.2777
-0.3181
0.6934

Table 4. Dwelling and household characteristics: Comparison across controls and treatment
households. (Respondents with active accounts, who have electric heat pumps and/or replace
them with electric heat pumps.)

year house was built
size of the house (sq ft)
townhome dummy
brick construction
frame house
house if of average construction quality
house if of good construction quality
number of floors
household income $120,000 or more (dummy)
number of children 0-11 yrs old
number of children 12-18 yrs old
number of adults 18-65 yrs old
number of adults 65 yrs old and older
number of persons in the household

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2013

Control group
Treatment
(N=282)
group (N=53)
1989.06
1989.34
1983.81
2126.77
0.0922
0.0377
0.0638
0.0754
0.1206
0.1887
0.6347
0.6792
0.0922
0.1698
1.7553
1.8301
0.3794
0.5472
0.468
0.2074
0.3972
0.2264
1.961
1.9057
0.1844
0.415
3.1213
2.8077

t test statistic
0.2503
-1.37
1.7256
-0.2953
-1.1819
-0.6283
-1.4149
-1.3275
-2.2409
2.699
1.964
0.3551
-2.1642
1.8555
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Table 5. Electricity usage comparison between households that changed their heat pumps with
and without incentive, before changing the heat pump. (Respondents with active accounts, who
have electric heat pumps and/or replace them with electric heat pumps.)
treatment group (changed heat
pump)

mean usage
mean log usage
mean log usage day
mean log usage foot

No
T
incentive
Incentive statistic
1923.36 1716.39
1.08
7.4428
7.3318
1.04
4.0155
3.8545 1.5853
-0.1248
-0.3924 3.2155

Table 6. Equipment choices of incentive takers and non-incentive replacers.
no
incentive

incentive

SEER
average
14.69
15.47
Cost of the new heat pump
median
6000
6000
average
6413.41
7062.5
max.
18000
18000
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Table 7. Determinants of heat pump replacement. Phase II respondents. N=60.

Reasons for changing the heat pump
Old heating equipment was broken or aging
The old heating system one was inadequate
I wanted to upgrade to a more energy-efficient system
I was doing another renovations at my house
I was planning to sell my home
I was offered an attractive deal
I was offered a rebate or a tax credit
I wanted to help reduce emissions
My system was the least expensive that still met the requirements for rebate
or tax credits
I wanted to save money

No
All -Rebate rebate
pct.
-- pct. -- pct.
85.00
89.47 77.27
31.67
42.11 13.64
16.67
21.05
9.09
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.67
2.63
0.00
10.00
15.79
0.00
1.67
0.00
4.55
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00

Table 8. Decisions had the rebate or tax credit been absent altogether. Phase II respondents who
received a rebate. N=38.
What would you have done had there been no rebate?
would have bought the same
would have bought a less expensive system
would have bought a system based on a different fuel
would have bought another model
would have bought a less energy efficient model
would have bought a less powerful system
I would have done without the system for a while
I would have waited before replacing the system

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2013

Pct.
71.05
15.79
0.00
0.00
5.26
2.63
7.89
2.63
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Table 9. Main regression results. Fixed effect models, “within” estimator. All standard errors
clustered at the household level. T statistics in parentheses. (Respondents with active accounts,
who have electric heat pumps and/or replace them with electric heat pumps.)

Variable
lbillingdays
ldegreedays
ldegreedaywinter
heattreat
Household-specific FE
Month  year effects
Nobs

all controls + treatment group
0.5172
(12.68)
0.3458
(19.39)
0.1416
(5.32)
-0.0808
(-2.38)
Yes
Yes
15063

Table 10. Effect of changing the heat pump: Robustness to construction of the sample and data
cleaning. Fixed effects regressions. (Respondents with active accounts, who have electric heat
pumps and/or replace them with electric heat pumps.).

Sample construction/data cleaning
(A) controls who haven’t installed any insulations, new
windows, etc. in the 5 years before the main survey +
treatment group

Nobs

heattreat
(t stat)

10064

-0.0702
(-2.25)

(B) + dropped 2 respondents who made additions to the
home

15025

(C) + dropped 1 respondent with PV

15000

-0.0824
(-2.38)
-0.0852
(-2.44)

(E) + drop obs with beginning date of billing period in or
April 2012

14613
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Table 11. Effect of changing heat pump. Heterogeneity with respect to housing and household
characteristics. Fixed effects regressions. (Respondents with active accounts, who have electric
heat pumps and/or replace them with electric heat pumps.)

All
home smaller than the median
home larger than the median
attic insulation absent
attic insulation present
home built before 1990
household has 2 members or fewer
household has more than 2 members
no one in the household older than 65
at least one person older than 65
sample is controls + changers with
broken or aging heat
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effect of
D on ln E
-0.0808
-0.0578
-0.103
-0.0418
-0.0823
-0.1663
-0.1038
-0.0521
0.0029
-0.1113
-0.0729

t stat
-2.38
-1.02
-2.90
-3.58
-2.34
-3.13
-1.92
-1.80
0.09
-2.16
-2.03
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Table 12. Effect of changing the heat pump: Effect of Incentive. Fixed effects regressions.
(Respondents with active accounts, who have electric heat pumps and/or replace them with
electric heat pumps.)

(A) controls + changers with no rebate*
(B) same as in (D); controls + changers with rebate*
(C) control and treatment group**

heattreat heattreat
heattreat  rebate  lrebate
Nobs
(t stat)
(t stat)
(t stat)
13182
-0.1855
(-3.02)
13923
-0.0359
(-1.01)
14613
-0.1832
0.1476
(-2.99)
(2.12)

(D) control and treatment group; if rebate, only if rebate
from federal government**

14073

-0.1853
(-3.02)

0.1051
(1.46)

(E) control and treatment group; drop if rebate is from
manufacturer only**

14527

0.1674
(1.97)

(F) control and treatment group**

14613

-0.1831
(-2.99)
-0.1727
(-2.85)

0.019
(1.81)

*: dropped 2 respondents who made additions to the home and 1 respondent with a PV system.
**: same as *, plus dropped last two months of 2012 data.

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper835
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Table 13. Average treatment effect of incentive: Free riders and motivation for changing the heat
pump. Fixed effects regressions. (Respondents with active accounts, who have electric heat
pumps and/or replace them with electric heat pumps.)
N

heattreat t stat

Specification with HEATTREAT dummy
drop strict free riders
14233
-0.1255
drop old heat pump was broken
13923
-0.1000
drop old heat pump was aging
14048
-0.0806
drop old heat pump inadequate
14332
-0.0976
drop old heat pump was broken or aging
13127
-0.1338
Specification with HEATTREAT dummy and log incentive amount
base model
15063
-0.1666
drop strict free riders
14233
-0.1709
drop old heat pump was broken
13923
-0.2241
drop old heat pump was aging
14048
-0.1414
drop old heat pump inadequate
14332
-0.1694
drop old heat pump was broken or aging
13127
-0.1090
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lrebatetreat t stat

-2.79
-2.50
-1.39
-2.17
-1.43
-2.76
-2.79
-3.05
-1.77
-2.31
-2.52

0.0192
0.0147
0.0231
0.0162
0.0213
-0.0064

1.85
1.19
1.86
0.93
1.9
0.0027
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